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The fatal consequences of industrial incidents have made evident the need for suitable tools to 
develop inherently safer process designs. Traditionally, in a process design project, the evaluation 
of safety aspects is left for analysis after the detailed design has been completed. This approach 
leads to the use of control loops, barriers and protection layers as the only ways to prevent incidents 
and to reduce the possible outcomes. An alternative to this approach is the application of the 
concept of inherent safety, which was introduced to set up several principles that aim to enhance 
process safety by eliminating, avoiding or minimizing sources of risk.  
In this work, we present a comparison of different safety metrics in their role to evaluate the risk 
associated with a given process design. The indices selected for consideration are better applied at 
the conceptual stage of the process design, and they were the Dow’s fire and explosion index 
(F&EI), the fire and explosion damage index (FEDI), the process route index (PRI) and the process 
stream index (PSI). All these indices use different input information and their outcomes have 
different rankings. The metrics were applied to an ethylene production process to identify risk 
levels, and the location of streams and pieces of equipment that pose the highest risk within the 
process. An evaluation of the indices in their capability to track design changes in operating 
conditions aiming to improve the safety level of the process was developed. To perform the 
assessment of the safety metrics in a more extensive manner, an uncertainty analysis based on a 
Monte Carlo simulation framework was implemented and compared to the traditional use of 
single-value design variables.  Within this context, an insightful assessment of uncertainty’s effect 
on process safety characteristics was achieved because of the identification of ranges of safety-
relevant performance outcomes (zones of risks and opportunities) that can be probabilistically 
characterized. The approach was applied to a case study related to the production of ethylene from 
shale gas. The results showed how some indexes are better suited to capture the risk characteristics 
associated with the process when changes in the operating conditions of the section with highest 
risk were implemented. The methodology can be extended to other processes of interest, and may 
serve as a basis for the safety and process design community to propose adjustments in the structure 
of the safety indices based on a better understanding of their performance and reliability as part of 
the efforts towards the continued improvement of those safety metrics. 
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1. Introduction 
Traditionally, safety analysis in a process design project is performed after the detailed design is 
completed. Within this approach, little can be done to modify the design in order to enhance safety 
performance (Lee et al., 2019). Instead, control loops, barriers, and protection layers are used to 
reduce the possible outcomes in case of an incident (Khan et al., 2003). Despite the usefulness of 
these devices to contain or minimize the consequences of an incident, past events have shown that 
these devices may fail to cause fatal consequences (Abidin et al., 2016). Inherent safety aims to 
eliminate, reduce or avoid sources of risk, thus improving the safety properties of the process 
(Rahman et al., 2005; Kidam et al., 2016).  
Inherent safety principles are better applied at early design stages, where the design can be easily 
modified to include safer features. To assess if the changes introduced to the design result in a 
safer process, it is necessary the use of proper metrics that evaluate safety levels of the process 
design. There are different tools to evaluate a process in terms of safety performance. Among the 
most popular ones are the hazard and operability (HAZOP) method and the quantitative risk 
assessment (QRA) (Roy et al., 2016). The HAZOP method is a qualitative tool that requires 
detailed information about the process. Typically, the type of information needed for a HAZOP 
analysis is not available in early design stages. The QRA is based on the probabilistic estimation 
of failures and consequences. Although this method may be suitable for the analysis of pieces of 
equipment (Medina-Herrera et al., 2014a; Medina-Herrera et al., 2014b) its use in a complete 
process may not be suitable at early design stages.    
As an alternative to these tools, safety indices have been developed to consider process 
characteristics that may result in potential incidents (Roy et al., 2016). The first index reported in 
the literature was the Dow’s fire and explosion index (F&EI). This index is based on material and 
process factors (AIChE, 1998) and although it considers detailed information of the process, it can 
be simplified to assess safety characteristics at the conceptual design stage (Suardin et al., 2007; 
Vázquez et al., 2018; Ruiz-Femenia et al., 2017). The Dow’s F&EI relies heavily on the material 
factor, which only reflects the characteristics of the chemicals but not the operating conditions. 
The latter aspect motivated the development of other indices that combine both operating 
conditions and chemical characteristics to obtain a more reliable safety assessment. One such index 
is the Fire and Explosion Damage Index (FEDI) developed by Khan and Abbasi (1998). This index 
classifies the units of a process according to its purpose and assesses the potential to cause hazards. 
Both indices, Dow’s F&EI and FEDI, consider the components in the process as individual 
components, not as mixtures. For the evaluation of both indices, only the characteristics of the 
most hazardous component are considered, overlooking the contribution of other hazardous 
components. To overcome this limitation, other indices have been introduced, such as the process 
route index (PRI) and the process stream index (PSI). These indices consider the hazardous 
characteristics of mixtures instead of those of single components. Additionally, these indices were 
developed to obtain information directly from process simulators, which eliminates the tedious 
procedure of information transfer and thus avoiding errors during the safety evaluation process 
(Leong & Shariff, 2009; Shariff et al., 2012). The combination of PRI and PSI may be used to 
identify hazardous areas in process designs, and examine the result of potential changes in the 
operating conditions of such areas on items such as risk and economic performance (Ortiz-
Espinoza et al., 2017). The PSI uses the principle of relative ranking to identify the most hazardous 
streams in a process in terms of fire and explosions, while PRI considers stream parameters such 
as combustibility, energy, density and pressure to rank different processes. While Dow’s F&EI 
and FEDI have an established ranking to interpret the results from the evaluation, the PRI index 
does not classify the results of the evaluation according to the level of hazard.    
The evaluation of these indices typically relies on information that, although represented as 
average values, is commonly uncertain.  The use of these types of input values may lead to the 
misinterpretation of the results, which may affect the decision-making process. The problem then 
is to formulate the evaluation model so that uncertainty in key design variables is included. One 
way to accomplish this task is the use of Monte Carlo (MC) simulation methods (Koc et al., 2012) 
which allows the consideration of multiple uncertain inputs. The uncertainty in the selected inputs 
is represented using probability distributions and then propagated through the model. Within this 
framework, distribution profiles are obtained for the evaluated metrics. Such profiles can be 
statistically characterized, and ranges of performance outcomes can be generated. This type of 
results provides more valuable insights that can be used by process decision-makers to make more 
informed decisions when selecting among different design options. 
In this work, the Dow’s F&EI, the FEDI, the PRI, and PSI indices are compared to identify which 
one may be more suitable to use at the conceptual stage of a process design. To complete the 
analysis, the evaluation of the indices is performed under a systematic uncertainty analysis 
framework. The metrics are applied to an ethylene production process, where the most hazardous 
areas or pieces of equipment in the process are identified. Modifications to the operating conditions 
are then implemented to find which index captures better such modifications.  Within the proposed 
uncertainty analysis, framework distribution profiles are obtained and probabilistically 
characterized for each index.  It should be pointed out that these safety indices profiles represent a 
potential advantage for decision-makers since possible underestimation of process risks in the 
presence of uncertainty could pose significant adverse effects.  
 
2. Approach 
The four indices analyzed in this work, the Dow’s fire and explosion index (F&EI), the fire and 
explosion damage index (FEDI), the process route index (PRI), and the process stream index (PSI), 
take into account the characteristics of the chemicals and the process conditions that can result in 
a fire and/or explosion incident. Each index takes into account different types of information from 
the process design, and their structure is different. A brief description of those indices is given 
below.  
 
2.1 The Dow’s Fire and Explosion Index (F&EI) 
The F&EI was developed in 1964 by the Dow Company (Roy et al., 2016). The index is calculated 
based on the material factor (MF) and the process unit hazards factor (F3Dow). The MF is selected 
according to the flammability and reactive characteristics of the chemical molecule involved in the 
process units. When more than one flammable or reactive chemical is present, the material factor 
is selected based on the most hazardous one. The process unit hazards factor is the result of the 
product of two other factors named general process hazards factor (F1Dow) and special process 
factor (F2Dow). Both factors result from the addition of a base factor and the penalties that result 
from considering some process characteristics. Equations 1 and 2 show how these factors are 
calculated, while equations 3 and 4 show the way in which F3Dow and the F&EI are computed.     








𝐹3𝐷𝑜𝑤 = (𝐹1𝐷𝑜𝑤)(𝐹2𝐷𝑜𝑤) (3) 
𝐹&𝐸𝐼 = (𝑀𝐹)(𝐹3𝐷𝑜𝑤) (4) 
 
The results obtained for the F&EI can be classified according to the degree of hazard proposed by 
the classification guide by AIChE (1994) (see Table 1). 
Table 1. Classification of units according to the F&EI 
F&EI range Degree of hazard 
1 – 60 Light 
61 – 96 Moderate 
97 – 127 Intermediate 
128 – 158 Heavy 
159 – up Severe 
 
2.2 The Fire and Explosion Damage Index (FEDI) 
The FEDI was developed as part of a system named hazard identification and ranking (HIRA) 
(Khan and Abbasi, 1998). This index classifies the units of an industrial process according to its 
purpose, as shown in Table 2.  
 
Table 2. Classification of units for FEDI estimation 
Group Type of unit Examples 
I Storage 
Storages tanks, intermediate process 
inventories 
II Involving physical operation 
Pumps, compressors, units involving 
heat transfer, mass transfer or phase 
change 
III Involving chemical reactions Reactors 
IV Transportation Pipelines 
V Other 
Boilers, direct-fired heat exchanger, 
flares, furnaces 
 
Once the unit to be evaluated has been classified, different energy factors are considered. The first 
energy factor (F1FEDI) accounts for chemical energy.  F1FEDI is given by the amount of chemical 
processed in the unit (M) and the heat of combustion (Hc). Energy factors F2FEDI and F3FEDI account 
for energy due to the internal pressure of the unit (physical energy). In the case of a unit of group 
III, a fourth factor (F4FEDI) is used. Equations 5 to 8 are used to calculate each energy factor,  
 










) (𝑃𝑃 − 𝑉𝑃)2(𝑉𝑜𝑙) (7) 





where M is in kg/s, PP is the operating pressure in kPa, Vol is the volume of the vessel in m3, T is 
the operating temperature in °C, VP is the vapor pressure in kPa and Hrxn is the heat released by 
chemical reactions in kJ/kg.  
After the estimation of the energy factors, penalty values are assigned to account for the severity 
of some process parameters such as temperature, pressure, capacity, and the characteristics of the 
chemicals. Then, energy factors and penalties are added to estimate the hazard potential (hazpot) 
according to equations 9 to 13. 


























Finally, the hazard potential is transformed into the FEDI with the use of Equation 14.  




The results for the FEDI can be ranked according to values in Table 3. 
Table 3. Hazard ranking according to FEDI values from the HIRA methodology* 
FEDI Hazard characterization 
FEDI > 500 Extremely hazardous 
500 > FEDI > 400 Highly hazardous 
400 > FEDI > 200 Hazardous 
200 > FEDI > 100 Moderately hazardous 
100 > FEDI > 20 Less hazard 
else No hazard 
*Source: Khan and Abbasi (1998) 
 
2.3 Process Route Index (PRI) and Process Stream Index (PSI)  
The PRI and the PSI were developed to include the contribution of individual components in 
mixtures to the process stream parameters associated to those indices (Leong & Shariff, 2009; 
Shariff et al., 2012). Both indices are based on parameters that impact the outcome of an explosion 
incident. Such parameters are density, pressure, energy, and combustibility. Although PRI and PSI 
are based on the same parameters, these indices are structured differently and have different 
purposes. The PRI is used to rank processes while the PSI is used to identify the most hazardous 
process streams within a process. An advantage of both indices is that the process stream 
parameters can be directly obtained from process simulators, easing off the computation process.  
2.3.1 Calculation of the Process Route Index (PRI) 
To estimate the PRI, values of density, pressure, and mass heating value (energy) for each stream 
are obtained from process simulations. In addition, to estimate the combustibility of the process 
streams, information such as stream composition and temperature is also extracted. Then, the 
information obtained from the process simulation is combined with data related to the lower and 
upper flammability limits (LFL and UFL) and the heat of combustion (∆Hc) for each component 
in the streams.  
Equations 15 and 16 show the effect of temperature in the flammability limits. Once the 
flammability limits of each component are adjusted due to the effect of temperature, flammability 
limits for the mixtures are computed as shown in equations 17 and 18,  
 

























where 𝐿𝐹𝐿𝑇 and 𝑈𝐹𝐿𝑇 stand for lower and upper flammability limits at a given temperature 𝑇, 
𝐿𝐹𝐿25 and 𝑈𝐹𝐿25 are the lower and upper flammability limits at 25 °C, and ∆𝐻𝑐 is the heat of 
combustion; 𝐿𝐹𝐿𝑚𝑖𝑥 and 𝑈𝐹𝐿𝑚𝑖𝑥 are the lower and upper flammability limits of the mixture, 𝑦𝑖 is 
the mole fraction of component 𝑖, and 𝐿𝐹𝐿𝑖 and 𝑈𝐹𝐿𝑖 are the lower and upper flammability limits 
of component 𝑖. Combustibility is then estimated with Equation 19. 
  
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝑈𝐹𝐿𝑚𝑖𝑥 − 𝐿𝐹𝐿𝑚𝑖𝑥 (19) 
 
Once combustibility is obtained, the average values of the parameters can be used to calculate the 

















2.3.2 Calculation of the Process Stream Index (PSI) 
PSI uses the principle of relative ranking to determine the more hazardous streams of a process. 
The index is composed of four sub-indices in which the four parameters (density, pressure, energy, 
and combustibility) are compared to the average parameter value for the process as in equations 
21 to 24. 
 
𝐼𝑒 =
ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚
𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑠
 (21) 
𝐼𝑃 =
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚
𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑠
 (22) 
𝐼𝜌 =
𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚
𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑠
 (23) 
𝐼𝐹𝐿 =
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚
𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑠
 (24) 
 
To calculate the value of PSI, the values from equations 21 to 24 are combined as follows, 
 
𝑃𝑆𝐼 = 𝐴0(𝐼𝑒𝐼𝑝𝐼𝜌𝐼𝐹𝐿) (25) 
 
where 𝐴0 is a constant used to adjust the order of magnitude of the index (we used a value of 10 
in this work). 
2.4 Uncertainty evaluation 
To account for the uncertainty in the inputs and propagate it through the model, an integrated 
framework using MC simulations was considered. The approach is based on the one proposed by 
Ortiz-Espinoza et al. (2019) and described in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. Integrated framework for the inclusion of uncertainty in the evaluation of safety 
performance of chemical processes 
A base case for the process is first developed. Then, it is necessary to select the safety evaluation 
model and to identify the input information needed, and probabilistic distributions are derived from 
information obtained from historical, plant, or literature data. 
After the probabilistic distributions are established, random values are sampled for each input 
using MC simulations. These values are then fed to the process simulator and the safety evaluation 
model. Data from process simulations and external information are used to evaluate the safety 
metrics. The results are gathered to generate the distribution profiles for the index. This step is 
repeated a sufficient number of times (10,000 in this case) to generate sufficient results so that a 
reliable characterization of the profiles can be done. The statistical characterization of the profiles 
includes minimum and maximum values, mean value, standard deviation, and values of risk and 
opportunity. 
 
3. Case Study 
To compare the selected safety metrics and its performance in the presence of uncertainty, an 
ethylene production process was evaluated. The process takes the production of ethylene from 
natural gas via the production of methanol. A great part of this process occurs in gas phase and 
with the presence of flammable gases (e.g. methane, hydrogen, carbon monoxide). The process 
consists of three stages, namely reforming, methanol synthesis, and olefins production. A detailed 
description of the process structure and its conditions may be consulted in Ortiz-Espinoza et al. 
(2017a). 
The safety, economic and sustainable features of this process were previously analyzed by Ortiz-
Espinoza et al. (2017b) in which the PSI was used to detect the most hazardous area of the process, 
and the PRI was used to assess changes in operating conditions. The Dow’s F&EI and the FEDI 
are additionally considered in this work; these indices give a numerical value per piece of 
equipment, so this helps to identify the most hazardous units in the process. Then, the highest 
number of all the values obtained is selected as the representative number for the whole process, 
and changes in the design are evaluated to see if the indices are able to account for the effects of 
such changes. The first two steps are performed using nominal values, after which the inclusion of 
uncertainty is carried out using the proposed approach displayed in Figure 1.   
 
3.1 Assumptions for safety evaluation 
3.1.1 PSI 
For the evaluation of the PSI, the four parameters considered by the index are put together by a 
multiplication rule. An important characteristic that is observed for this index is that since all 
factors are weighted equally, the results may be biased by the presence of different stream phases, 
due to high differences of density. Therefore, liquid and gas streams are considered separately, i.e. 
the gas phase streams are evaluated with the average value of the gas streams only, and the liquid 
streams are evaluated only with liquid streams data.    
3.1.2 F&EI 
For the estimation of the Dow’s F&EI, the assumptions and recommendations in the classification 
guide (AIChE, 1998) are followed. For the estimation of the 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦7𝐹2  term, the amount of 
flammable material that can be released from the process unit within 10 minutes is considered.  
Penalties for unit location (𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦4𝐹1 ), access (𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦5𝐹1 ), drainage and spill control 
(𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦6𝐹1 ), corrosion and erosion (𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦8𝐹2 ), and leakage (𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦9𝐹2 ) are not considered, 
since the information needed for their calculations is not available at the conceptual design stage 
of the process.  
 
3.1.3 FEDI 
The estimation of the FEDI is made using the methodology reported in Khan et al. (2001). For the 
assessment of distillation columns, the quantity of material is estimated as proposed in Castillo-
Landero et al. (2019) using Equation 26. The conditions at the top of the column are used for safety 
calculations as suggested in Thiruvenkataswamy et al. (2016). 
 
𝑀 = 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑑 + 𝐿 + 𝑉′ (26) 
  
Since the index considers the volume of the vessel as an important component to calculate energy 
factors, small equipment units such as mixers and splitters are not evaluated.   
   
3.1.4 PRI 
For the assessment of the PRI only streams in gas phase are considered, since most of the process 
streams are in the gas phase.  
 
4. Results 
4.1 Safety evaluation 
4.1.1 PSI 
The evaluation of safety indices was performed using the information obtained from Aspen Plus 
simulations and external data sources (e.g. NFPA, Dow’s F&EI guide). The results for the PSI 
evaluation are summarized in Table 4, and the most hazardous streams are highlighted in Figure 
2. As can be observed, the most hazardous gas streams are contained in the methanol synthesis 
loop. According to the values in Table 4, the main contribution to the PSI values of such streams 
is the sub-index IP that accounts for the effect of pressure. The two most hazardous liquid streams 
are also highlighted in Figure 2. 
Although the consideration of the phase stream may be relevant, e.g. a liquid stream leaking will 
release more material than a gaseous stream at the same conditions, to assess the hazard levels 
correctly would require the consideration of other factors such as flash point and vapor pressure, 




Table 4. PSI results for the streams of the ethylene process 
Stream Ie IP Iρ IFL PSI Stream Ie IP Iρ IFL PSI 
1 0.425 0.712 0.590 0.320 0.573 26 0.608 0.043 0.027 0.628 0.004 
2 0.409 0.570 0.527 0.313 0.384 27 1.271 0.370 0.644 0.534 1.619 
3 0.409 0.570 0.318 0.464 0.343 28 1.276 0.370 0.641 0.534 1.618 
4 0.348 0.570 0.161 2.055 0.654 29 1.331 0.370 0.656 0.534 1.727 
5 0.515 0.570 0.525 1.660 2.557 30 1.331 0.698 1.096 0.542 5.517 
6 0.515 0.570 0.525 1.660 2.557 31 1.356 0.698 1.580 0.519 7.769 
7 0.914 0.570 0.340 1.660 2.943 32 1.367 0.698 1.755 0.963 16.116 
8 0.914 0.570 0.340 1.660 2.943 33 1.826 0.251 0.218 0.950 0.949 
9 0.394 0.570 0.944 1.073 2.272  ^34 1.144 0.380  0.994  1.723  7.437  
10 0.914 0.570 0.340 1.660 2.943  ^35 1.144  0.872  0.997  1.723  17.124  
11 0.760 0.570 0.420 1.571 2.858  ^36 1.110  1.057  0.853  0.580  5.812  
12 0.758 0.570 0.410 1.577 2.793 37 1.293 0.575 2.212 0.243 3.996 
13 0.758 2.364 0.990 1.743 30.956 38 1.293 0.624 2.396 0.243 4.702 
14 0.786 2.364 1.081 1.567 31.472 39 1.104 0.817 0.868 0.445 3.716 
15 0.751 2.364 1.531 1.186 32.247 C4's 1.276 0.216 0.885 0.231 0.566 
16 0.753 2.307 1.928 1.108 37.108 ^C5's 1.129 0.328  1.047  0.404  1.567 
17 0.759 2.202 1.812 1.105 33.443 ^Ethane 1.177  0.880  0.813  0.512  4.308  
18 0.860 2.136 1.610 1.045 30.920 Ethylene 1.329 0.581 1.913 0.928 13.709 
19 0.860 2.136 1.610 1.128 33.377 Hydrogen 2.814 0.570 0.103 1.967 3.245 
20 0.860 2.136 1.610 1.128 33.377 Natural Gas 1.441 0.741 0.885 0.281 2.658 
21 0.860 2.136 1.610 1.128 33.377 ^Propane 1.117  0.945  0.846  0.458  4.094  
22 0.860 2.364 1.706 1.136 39.412 Propylene 1.292 0.624 2.428 0.244 4.776 
23 0.860 2.364 1.429 1.177 34.214 Purge 0.866 0.285 0.368 0.552 0.502 
^24  0.539 3.236  1.260  1.585  34.799  Syngas Purge 0.860 2.136 1.610 1.128 33.377 
 ^25  1.129 0.328  1.047  0.405  1.567  Tail gas 2.314 0.251 0.196 1.228 1.397 
^Liquid streams 
 
4.1.2 Dow’s F&EI 
The results for the estimation of the Dow’s F&EI are reported in Table 5, and the hazzard 
classification for each piece of equipment is shown in Figure 3. Similarly to the results for PSI, 
the equipment unit identified as the most hazardous one is the methanol synthesis reactor. 
Additionally, most of the units in the methanol synthesis loop are classified as intermediate in 
terms of hazard. The rest of the equipment is classified as moderate or light hazard, except for the 
reactors in the reforming stage. This result may be due to the penalties considered for exothermic 











Figure 2. Identification of hazardous streams using process stream index (PSI) 
 
 
Table 5. Dow’s F&EI results for the equipment of the ethylene process 
Piece of equipment F&EI Classification Piece of equipment F&EI Classification 
Heater-1 1.7 Light Splitter-2 99.6 Intermediate 
Mixer-1 85.2 Moderate Mixer-4 90.9 Moderate 
Pre reformer reactor 100.3 Intermediate Compressor-2 116.0 Intermediate 
Heater-2 83.6 Moderate Flash unit-3 48.7 Light 
SR Reactor 125.2 Intermediate MTO Reactor 90.8 Moderate 
Cooler-1 104.3 Intermediate Catalyst regenerator 94.4 Moderate 
Flash unit-1 93.8 Moderate Quenching tower 82.0 Moderate 
CO2 removal unit 93.8 Moderate CO2 removal unit 82.2 Moderate 
Splitter-1 93.8 Moderate Dryer 82.2 Moderate 
H2 removal unit 81.7 Moderate Compressor-3 99.0 Intermediate 
Mixer-2 91.4 Moderate Cooler-4 94.2 Moderate 
Heater-3 91.4 Moderate De-C2 column 94.2 Moderate 
Compressor-1 112.6 Intermediate Cooler-5 84.4 Moderate 




Pump-1 93.8 Moderate 
C2-Splitter 81.9 Moderate 
Cooler-2 104.7 Intermediate De-C3 column 62.9 Moderate 
Heat exchanger-1 105.0 Intermediate Compressor-4 59.0 Light 
Cooler-3 103.9 Intermediate C3-Splitter 59.0 Light 
Flash unit-2 103.9 Intermediate De-C4 column 42.8 Light 





Results for the ethylene process using the FEDI index are presented in Table 6 and Figure 4. Some 
discrepancies are observed with respect to the PSI and the F&EI results. According to the FEDI 
evaluation, the most hazardous piece of equipment is the C3-Splitter column, followed by the de-
propanizer unit and the methanol reactor, which are classified as hazardous. One important 
characteristic of this index is that it considers the volume of the vessel in the estimation of the 
physical energy factor (F2FEDI and F3FEDI). Therefore, for the biggest units such as distillation 
columns, the results may be influenced by their size. From the results of the PSI and F&EI, 
however, this may not necessarily represent an accurate hazard level for the process unit.  
 
 
Figure 3. Classification of equipment according to degree of hazard using the Dow’s F&EI 
 
4.2 Assessment of design changes  
Given that we are dealing with a conceptual design stage of the process and that we have identified 
the most hazardous pieces of equipment, changes to the design to enhance safety levels can be 
readily analyzed. To keep track of the effect of the changes in the process safety performance, the 
safety metrics are evaluated for each individual change implemented for the process conditions. 
To evaluate the response of the indices on the same basis, the modifications were made to the 
operating pressure of the methanol synthesis loops, since two out of the three indices identified 
this area of the process as the most hazardous. The results for the evaluation of the different indices 
at different operating pressures are reported in Table 7. 
 







Heater-1 18.0 No hazard Flash unit-3 93.1 Less Hazardous 
Pre reformer 
reactor 
140.4 Moderately hazardous MTO Reactor 123.8 Moderately hazardous 
Heater-2 148.1 Moderately hazardous Quenching tower 119.0 Moderately hazardous 
SR Reactor 151.3 Moderately hazardous CO2 removal unit 91.3 Less Hazardous 
Cooler-1 157.5 Moderately hazardous Dryer 91.3 Less Hazardous 
Flash unit-1 156.9 Moderately hazardous Compressor-3 89.6 Less Hazardous 
CO2 removal unit 134.9 Moderately hazardous Cooler-4 89.7 Less Hazardous 
Heater-3 107.5 Moderately hazardous De-C2 column 199.8 Moderately hazardous 




De-methanizer 113.8 Moderately hazardous 
Pump-1 71.9 Less Hazardous 
Cooler-2 119.7 Moderately hazardous C2-Splitter 164.8 Moderately hazardous 
Heat exchanger-1 119.5 Moderately hazardous De-C3 column 300.3 Hazardous 
Cooler-3 122.5 Moderately hazardous Compressor-4 147.9 Moderately hazardous 
Flash unit-2 122.4 Moderately hazardous C3-Splitter 526.0 Extremely hazardous 








Table 7. Safety indices evaluated for different pressures 
 of the methanol synthesis reactor  
 
Pressure, bar PRI F&EI FEDI 
83 9.47 136.8 306.6 
70 8.00 135.8 306.5 
60 6.84 135.4 306.4 
50 5.81 135.3 306.3 
  
 
The F&EI and the FEDI do not present a significant change. While changes in the PRI values are 
more notorious, the lack of a ranking for the PRI hinders the possibility to classify these changes 
in terms of hazard levels. One possible reason for the minor change in the F&EI and FEDI indices 
is the way in which they are structured, i.e. while there is a decrease of pressure, an increase in the 
quantity of chemical handled by the unit may compensate the overall effect on the value of the 
index.  
 
4.3 Uncertainty analysis 
The uncertainty analysis was made considering the probability distributions shown in Table 8. 
These distributions take into account the pressure ratio of the compressors in the methanol 
synthesis loop, where most of the hazardous equipment or streams are located.   
By applying the approach depicted in Figure 1, we obtained the cumulative probability 
distributions shown in figures 5 to 7. The doted lines in those figures represent the expected 
(nominal) values.    
 
Table 8. Uncertain inputs and probability distributions+ 
Variable Minimum Most likely Maximum 
Compressor-1 pressure ratio (83 bar) 3.94 4.15 4.37 
Compressor-2 pressure ratio (83 bar) 1.05 1.11 1.17 
+Note: Distribution types were triangular. 
 
 












Figure 7. Probability distribution for the PRI 
 
The results show that the expected values for the F&EI and the FEDI have a high probability of 
occurrence, 87% and 97.3% respectively, while the PRI expected value has only 57%. This 
observation indicates that the F&EI and the FEDI indices can produce good results with nominal 
values. It should be pointed out that it is always desirable that the calculated occurrence of an index 
value is as high as possible, because a low probability could represent an underrating of the indices 
when using nominal values. The results were complemented by the probabilistic characterization 
of the three indicators reported in Table 4. Standard deviation values for the three indices as fairly 
low, in accordance with the minimum and maximum values that were obtained for the calculation 
of the indices. 
 
Table 4. Probabilistic characterization of results for the MTO process with methanol synthesis  
Metric Mean Minimum Maximum Standard deviation P5 P95 
PRI  9.41 8.54 10.06 0.26 8.98 9.84 
F&EI 136.75 135.61 137.67 0.36 136.16 137.35 




Four safety indices were analyzed, out of which three (PRI, F&EI and FEDI) are related to the 
performance of the overall process and one of them (PSI) to the risk characterization of streams 
within the process. assessment of safety The indices are conveniently applied during the 
conceptual design of a process. Regarding the indices related to the overall process performance, 
their comparison identified some disadvantages of those metrics when evaluating flowsheets that 
contain processing tasks carried out mostly in the gas phase. The comparison was completed with 
an uncertainty analysis that provides insightful information about the metrics. It was observed that 
the PSI and F&EI indices classified the streams and the units within the same process area as the 
most hazardous. The FEDI also identified the equipment pieces in the same area as hazardous, but 
with a lower risk level. This result may be influenced by the term of volume that is used in the 
calculation of the FEDI index. With regard to the usefulness of the indices to track changes in the 
process design, only the PRI was able to reflect a significant numerical change, but its lack of 
relationship with respect to a hazard level characterization of the process limits the usefulness of 
this finding. The results obtained for the indices call for the need to develop a new or modified 
index through a careful inclusion of the major characteristics of the three indices analyzed in this 
work, so that items that appear to be relevant for the evaluation of risk are taken into account. On 
the other hand, elimination of terms that bias the results towards a particular class of streams or 
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